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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL COURTS––
WITNESSES, EVIDENCE, AND CONDUCT OF COUNSEL:
ASSESSING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE EVIDENCE TO
PROVE WITNESS BIAS
Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016)
ABSTRACT
In Ventura v. Kyle, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals formed two
major holdings that differed with the holdings from the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota. This case involved former
Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura, Navy SEAL and author Chris Kyle,
and his book “American Sniper.” Specifically, the court reversed the
unjust-enrichment judgment and vacated and remanded the defamation
judgment for a new trial. However, the most significant holding for North
Dakota legal practitioners was that the Eighth Circuit vacated the district
court’s defamation judgment and damages that were awarded in favor of
Ventura, because the district court clearly abused its discretion in denying
Kyle a new trial. The court reasoned that both the closing remarks made by
Ventura’s counsel and the improper cross-examination of witnesses from
the publisher of Kyle’s book regarding insurance coverage prevented Kyle
from receiving a fair trial. One specific aspect of this holding involved the
Eighth Circuit applying two standards to complement Rules 403 and 411 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence and assessing the admissibility of insurance
evidence to prove witness bias: the “economic ties” standard and the more
popular “substantial connection analysis” common law standard that has
been applied in a majority of jurisdictions. Because Rules 403 and 411 of
the North Dakota Rules of Evidence contain essentially the same language
as their federal counterparts, Ventura and its application of standards for
admitting insurance evidence to prove witness bias can be applied in future
North Dakota cases involving similar evidentiary matters. This application
will provide North Dakota common law with a more unified and objective
standard for determining the admissibility of insurance evidence.
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I. FACTS
Before his death, Chris Kyle,1 a former sniper for a United States Navy
Sea, Air and Land (“SEAL”) team, authored the book “American Sniper:
The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History”

1. After Chris Kyle was killed in 2013, Taya Kyle, his wife and the executor of his estate,
was substituted as the defendant in the case. Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 878 n.1 (8th Cir.
2016). For simplicity, the defendant will be referred to as “Kyle.”
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(“American Sniper”).2 “In this book, Kyle described punching a ‘celebrity’
referred to as ‘Scruff Face,’” later revealed to be political commentator,
former Navy special forces member, and Minnesota Governor James Janos,
more widely known as Jesse Ventura.3 The alleged altercation relating to
this legal action took place at a California bar in October 2006, where Kyle
and some friends were gathered after a funeral for a fellow Navy SEAL.4
According to Kyle, Ventura made offensive remarks about both
America and the Navy SEALs.5 After Kyle confirmed the fight with
Ventura had occurred during both a radio interview and a television
interview on Bill O’Reilly’s “‘The O’Reilly Factor,’” Kyle’s editor
described the publicity from the radio interview as “‘priceless,’” while
Kyle’s publicist “agreed the publicity response was ‘HOT, hot, hot!’”6 In
2014, Kyle’s editor testified that 1.5 million copies of the “American
Sniper” book had been sold.7
After the radio and television interviews, “Ventura sued Kyle for
defamation, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment on the grounds that
Kyle fabricated the entire interaction with Ventura.”8 After the district
court denied Kyle’s motion for summary judgment on Ventura’s claims of
misappropriation and unjust enrichment, Kyle moved for summary
judgment on all claims at the close of discovery.9 Kyle’s motion was again
rejected.10
Among witnesses’ testimonies for the defamation claim, two witnesses
from the publisher of Kyle’s “American Sniper” book, HarperCollins,
testified at trial.11 First, HarperCollins’s publicist, Sharyn Rosenblum,
testified that the story regarding Ventura “was ‘a very insignificant part’” of
the book and did not impact the success of the book.12 In fact, in regard to
the general process of preparing the book for publication, Rosenblum
testified that:
[S]he did not know who “Scruff Face” was when she read the
manuscript of the book, and did not ask. She testified she did not

2. Id. at 878.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 878-79.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 879.
7. Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 at 879.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 880.
12. Id.
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see the “Scruff Face” subchapter as relevant to her publicity
campaign for the book but she wanted to focus on “the themes of
the war, military service, love of country, [and] the patriotism to
serve one’s country.” She was “surprise[d]” when Ventura’s name
came up in Kyle’s interview.13
Similarly, Peter Hubbard, Kyle’s editor, testified that “the ‘Scruff Face’
story was not relevant to his decision to enter into a book contract with
Kyle.”14
Plus, Hubbard also indicated that he never suggested
incorporating the subchapter containing “the ‘Scruff Face’ story” into the
book’s marketing campaign conducted by HarperCollins.15 Hubbard
“characterized the ‘mention of Jesse Ventura’ as having a ‘negligible’ effect
on the success of the book.”16
When Ventura’s counsel tried to impeach Rosenblum and Hubbard by
asking questions regarding both Kyle’s and HarperCollins’ insurance
coverage to show that the book’s publisher “had ‘a direct financial interest
in the outcome of th[e] litigation’ and the witnesses were biased in favor of
Kyle,” Rosenblum denied knowledge of HarperCollins’ insurance policy17
and Hubbard said that he did not know about any insurance provisions
within the Kyle-HarperCollins contract.18
However, during closing arguments, Ventura’s counsel stated that,
“Sharyn Rosenblum testified that she did not know her company’s insurer
is on the hook if you find that Jesse Ventura was defamed,” and despite both
witnesses’ testimony, “[i]t’s hard to believe that they didn’t know about the
insurance policy because it’s right in Kyle’s publishing contract. Paragraph
6.B.3. of Exhibit 82, Chris Kyle is an additional insured for defamation
under the publisher’s insurance policy.”19
After the district court denied both of Kyle’s motions for a mistrial, due
to Ventura’s counsel’s questioning of the HarperCollins witnesses, and
denied Kyle’s motion for a mistrial, “due to the insurance references once
the jury was excused” during Ventura’s counsel’s closing argument, the
jury reached an 8-2 verdict on the fifth day of deliberation.20 The jury

13. Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 at 880.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Ventura’s counsel specifically asked Rosenblum two questions: “‘[A]re you aware
that the legal fees for the estate’s attorneys . . . are being paid by the insurance company for
HarperCollins?’ and ‘Are you aware that HarperCollins has a direct financial interest in the
outcome of this litigation because they are providing the insurance?’” Id.
18. Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 at 880.
19. Id. at 880-81.
20. Id.
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found in favor of Ventura regarding the defamation claim and awarded him
$500,000 in damages.21 The jury made an advisory recommendation in
Ventura’s favor regarding the unjust enrichment for approximately $1.35
million in damages.22 However, the jury did find for Kyle regarding the
misappropriation claim.23 Ultimately, the district court adopted the jury’s
recommendations regarding both the unjust enrichment claim and its
damages amount.24
On appeal, Kyle argued the district court’s denial of his motion for a
new trial “on the grounds that the jury’s ‘awards were tainted by the
admission of prejudicial testimony and argument regarding [Kyle’s]
insurance.’”25 Kyle also argued that the unjust enrichment judgment
violated both Minnesota law and the First Amendment and that Ventura did
not prove the amount that he was enriched.26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
When determining the admissibility of insurance evidence to prove
witness bias or prejudice, Rules 403 and 411 of both the Federal and North
Dakota Rules of Evidence contain virtually identical language.27 However,
while the Eighth Circuit adopted the majority substantial connection
standard at the federal level, North Dakota strictly adheres to interpreting its
evidentiary rules with no clear standard.28 This lack of uniformity within
the Eighth Circuit common law may be due to the fact that no clear set of
criteria exists for the substantial connection analysis.
A. INTRODUCTION: GRANTING A NEW TRIAL
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that upon a
proper motion, a federal district court may grant a new trial on either all or
only some of the issues,29 and to any party, in the following manners:
21. Id. at 881.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 878.
24. Ventura, 825 F.3d at 878.
25. Id. at 881.
26. Id.
27. Compare FED. R. EVID. 403, 411, with N.D. R. EVID. 403, 411.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. Courts must use discretion when determining whether one issue can be separately retried
apart from the other issues in a respective case “without injustice.” 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 35
(2016). Furthermore, it is appropriate to limit a new trial to only certain issues “when it appears to
the court that justice can be done by limiting the retrial to the area in which error occurred.” Id.
In addition, the propriety of granting a new trial on only certain issues “hinges on whether the
issues to be retried are sufficiently distinct and separable from the others that the trial of those
issues alone may be had without injustice.” Id.
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[A]fter a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court; or . . .
after a nonjury trial, for any reason for which a rehearing has
heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court.30
New trial motions must satisfy a “particularity requirement,” meaning
that the motion must particularly state the grounds for the motion, otherwise
the motion must generally be denied.31 Thus, if the assignment of error is a
very general basis such as “‘the verdict is against the law’ or ‘against the
evidence,’” a new trial ordinarily may not be granted.32 Essentially, then,
an order for a new trial can only be granted on the specified ground(s)
within the motion itself.33
Furthermore, even though motions for a new trial are generally at the
discretion of the district court, those types of motions are reviewed by a
court of appeals for abuse of discretion.34 If a motion for a new trial is
denied, reversing that denial “is proper if the district court made a legal
error in applying the standard for a new trial or if the record contains no
evidence in support of the verdict.”35 Regardless of whether a trial court
grants or denies new trial motions, the rule stating that the review of either
of those actions is only permissible in reviewing abuse of discretion where
the motion is based on jury bias as well as misconduct of counsel or
jurors.36
Also, if a district court denies a new trial motion, an appellate court
must affirm that decision “if a reasonable person could have reached a
similar decision, given the evidence before him, not that a reasonable
person would have reached that decision.”37 Likewise, a new trial will not
be granted simply because the court would have reached a different
conclusion than the jury reached.38 Rather, neither a reversal nor a new trial
is required in the absence of “error affecting the substantial rights of the
parties.”39

30. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2016).
31. 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 345 (2016).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 636 (2016).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (2016); Hiser v. XTO Energy, Inc., 768 F.3d 773, 776 (8th
Cir. 2014)).
38. 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 42 (2016).
39. Id.
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Many aspects within the rationale of granting a new trial are predicated
around the notion of fairness and justice.40 This includes claims of
excessive damages, evidentiary matters,41 or other claims stating that the
moving party did not receive a fair trial.42 In relevant part, new trial
motions can also raise questions of law that arise out of “alleged substantial
errors in the admission or rejection of evidence or in instructions to the
jury.”43 In Ventura, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals cited language
from its own common law precedent to establish that in order for Kyle to be
granted a new trial on the defamation claim, the district court’s denial of
granting a new trial must be “a ‘clear abuse of discretion.’”44
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE EVIDENCE UNDER FED. R. EVID. 411
TO PROVE WITNESS BIAS OR PREJUDICE: THE SUBSTANTIAL
CONNECTION MAJORITY STANDARD VERSUS MINORITY
STANDARDS
One of the oldest American legal doctrines still in use today is the
“insurance exclusionary rule” and is currently codified within Rule 411 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.45 This rule basically states that “evidence
that a party is or is not insured may not be admitted to prove that party’s
negligence . . . it precludes any reference to the topic of ‘insurance’ that is
intended solely to divulge the existence of a party’s insurance coverage.”46
Similar to the rationale behind judicial discretion in granting a new
trial, the rationale underlying the admissibility of insurance evidence
involves notions of fairness and justice. Specifically, unless a court
approves of a legitimate and admissible purpose for insurance evidence
under the confines of Rules 403 and 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
evidence of liability insurance has generally been forbidden because it
carries “a substantial risk of unfair prejudice, inviting the jury to find
against a blameless defendant because the insurance company, not the
defendant, will have to pay the judgment.”47 This rationale even applies in

40. Id.
41. Id. (Evidentiary matters include claims stating that the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Ventura, 825 F.3d at 882 (citing Behlmann v. Century Sur. Co., 794 F.3d 960, 963 (8th
Cir. 2015).
45. Alan Calnan, The Insurance Exclusionary Rule Revisited: Are Reports of Its Demise
Exaggerated? 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1177, 1177 (1991).
46. Id.
47. 2 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 9:22 (7th ed.
2016).
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cases dealing with the admissibility of evidence that a defendant did not
have liability insurance because there is a “reverse risk” that a jury might
base its decisions on sympathy for the defendant instead of the merits of the
case.48
Despite its expressed purpose of ensuring that jury verdicts are based
on legitimate grounds rather than “the improper notion that a judgment
adverse to the defendant will be passed along to a ‘deep pocket’ insurance
company,” the insurance exclusionary rule has received much criticism,
including the argument that today’s jurors “supposedly are not influenced
by insurance references because they are already aware of the prevalence of
insurance in such litigation and may actually presume its existence.”49
Critics of the rule further argue that even if jurors are influenced by
insurance references, “‘extensive and unnecessary arguments, reversals, and
retrials stemming from elusive questions of prejudice and good faith’”
make the insurance exclusionary rule too costly to implement.50
Nevertheless, the insurance exclusionary rule still exists within Rule 411 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Although Rule 411 does not allow the introduction of evidence to show
whether a person was insured against liability in order to prove if that
person “acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully,” insurance evidence can
be admitted to prove the bias or prejudice of a witness.51 However, Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a court to exclude relevant
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”52 In other words, as indicated by the 2011
amendments to Rule 411, even if evidence is offered for a purpose not
explicitly barred by Rule 411, its admissibility is still subject to the court’s
discretion under Rule 403.53
While the Eighth Circuit’s opinion is only broken down into one
section regarding the defamation claim and another section committed to
the unjust enrichment claim, the court’s analysis within the defamation

48. Id.; see also 23 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5367 (1st ed.
2016) (footnote omitted) (“And some courts have admitted evidence of insurance under the
doctrine of ‘curative admissibility’ to impeach testimony by the defendant that insinuates that he
is impecunious and will be harmed by a large judgment”).
49. Calnan, supra note 45, at 1177-79.
50. Id. at 1179.
51. FED. R. EVID. 411 (2016).
52. FED. R. EVID. 403 (2016).
53. FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.
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portion of the opinion contains several important subparts that collectively
assessed whether the district court clearly abused its discretion by denying
Kyle a new trial. The first important subpart of this portion of the opinion
analyzed the admissibility of the insurance testimony under Rule 411 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence that was given by the witnesses from
HarperCollins.54 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit adopted the majority
standard in this area of the law, the “‘substantial connection’ analysis”
standard, which states:
[I]n order to balance the probative value and potential
prejudice . . . The substantial connection analysis looks to whether
a witness has “a sufficient degree of connection with the liability
insurance carrier to justify allowing proof of this relationship as a
means of attacking the credibility of the witness.”55
As early as 2001, the substantial connection standard was only adopted
by “a handful of other jurisdictions,” even though commentators recognized
that insurance evidence can potentially have a “distorting effect” during
trial because juries are more likely to hold defendants liable and impose
higher damages when those defendants are perceived to have a healthy
source of assets.56 As late as 2003, only one jurisdiction adopted “a per se
rule allowing the admission of commonality of insurance evidence.”57
Currently, the substantial connection standard’s status as the majority
standard closely aligns with the underlying rationale behind the
admissibility of insurance evidence. Specifically, the risk of unfair
prejudice in relation to insurance evidence’s probative value is generally
viewed as too high when either a defense witness’ affiliation with the
defendant’s insurance company is “purely coincidental” or when both the
defendant and his expert are merely policyholders in the same insurance
company.58 In fact, it has even been encouraged to use other means besides
introducing insurance evidence if those means can establish an equivalent
bias.59 But despite its popularity, the substantial connection standard that
was provided in Bonser v. Shainholtz is generally quite vague.60 However,

54. Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 883 (8th Cir. 2016).
55. Id. (quoting Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422, 425 (Colo. 2000).
56. J. Christopher Clark, South Carolina’s “Substantial Connection” Test for Introducing
Evidence of Insurance to Prove Witness Bias, S. C. LAW. 15, 17 (2002).
57. Stacey D. Mullins, Evidence for Trial Lawyers, in ASSOC. TRIAL LAW. AM., ATLA
WINTER 2003 CONVENTION REFERENCE MANUAL (2003).
58. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 47, § 9:27.
59. Id.
60. Andrew M. LaFontaine, Rule 411: Excluding Evidence of Insurance Offered to Show
Witness Bias, 38 COLO. LAW. 17, 17 (2009).
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common law from multiple jurisdictions attempted to clear up that
ambiguity.61
After adopting the substantial connection standard in Yoho v.
Thompson,62 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a substantial
connection existed between the respondent’s expert witness and the
petitioner’s underinsured motorist carrier that assumed the respondent’s
defense.63 However, instead of establishing a generalizable standard, the
Yoho court only determined a fact-specific standard applicable to that given
case, holding that a substantial connection existed where, instead of merely
being paid an expert’s fee in the case at hand, the expert witness: (1)
“maintained an employment relationship” with both the insurance company
in question and other insurance companies; (2) performed consultations in
other cases for the insurance company in question; (3) gave lectures to the
agents and adjusters of the insurance company in question; (4) reviewed
records for the insurance company in question and other insurance
companies so much that ten to twenty percent of his practice consisted of
doing so; and (5) the expert witness’s yearly salary was partly based on his
insurance consulting work.64
Under Colorado law, courts must apply a two-pronged test to
determine whether insurance evidence offered to show a witness’s bias is
admissible: (1) determine if “a substantial connection exists between the
witness and the insurance carrier” and (2) use the discretionary powers
afforded to judges under Rule 403 of the Colorado Rules of Evidence to
determine if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value of the insurance evidence.65 In Garcia v. Mekonnen,66 six
years after the Bonser court articulated the substantial connection standard,
the Colorado Court of Appeals sought to clarify the majority standard in
two important ways.67
First, after holding that an expert witness, who testified so many times
on behalf of the plaintiff’s insurance carrier that nearly half of his income
derived from such testimony, did not have a substantial connection with the
respective insurer because no evidence showed that the expert witness’

61. See generally ALASKA R. EVID. 403, 411; COLO. R. EVID. 403, 411; S.C. R. EVID. 403,
411 (clarifying this jurisdictional comparison is useful because Rules 403 and 411 are similar to
their counterparts in the Fed. R. Evid. and N. D. R. Evid.).
62. 548 S.E.2d 584 (2001).
63. Id. at 586.
64. Id.
65. LaFontaine, supra note 60, at 17.
66. 156 P.3d 1171 (Colo. App. 2007).
67. LaFontaine, supra note 60, at 17-18.
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personal finances would be affected by an adverse judgment in the case,
Mekonnen “established that the substantial connection test required
something ‘beyond mere payment in exchange for testimony at trial.’”68
Instead, the court illustrated that the substantial connection “had to rise to
the level of ownership, agency, or employment to qualify.”69 In other
words, the substantial connection must be “a relationship in which a witness
has a ‘direct interest in the outcome of the litigation.’”70 In fact, as long as
a witness does have a direct interest in the outcome of the respective
litigation, courts have recognized a substantial connection even when an
expert witness and a respective insurer do not have a formal employment
relationship.71
Second, Mekonnen crucially emphasized that even if a substantial
connection is found, courts must still use their broad discretion under Rule
403 of the Colorado Rules of Evidence, which is nearly identical to its
North Dakota and federal counterparts, to determine insurance evidence’s
admissibility.72 In other words, the substantial connection standard can
greatly aid and supplement courts in determining the admissibility of
insurance evidence, but the foundation of this type of judicial determination
still rests in the rules of evidence. In fact, the Mekonnen court emphasized
that even if insurance evidence presents a substantial connection, judicial
discretion under Rule 403 can set such a high burden of admissibility that
the insurance evidence’s probative value can actually weaken if other types
of evidence exist to show witness bias without mentioning insurance,73
which would support the previously stated rationale that other means
besides insurance evidence should be used if those means can establish an
equivalent bias.74
In addition to Mekonnen’s help clarifying the substantial connection
analysis, Alaska’s jurisdiction provides two types of insight. First, the
Supreme Court of Alaska in Ray v. Draeger sheds light on the substantial

68. Id. at 18.
69. Id.
70. Ray v. Draeger, 353 P.3d 806, 812 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Mendoza v. Varon, 563
S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)).
71. Id. at 812-13 (citing Lombard v. Rohrbaugh, 551 S.E.2d 349, 355 (2001)). The Draeger
court elaborately agreed with this principle by further stating, “This is particularly true given the
modern corporate structure where employment and consulting relationships are often created ad
hoc or through an intermediary and do not conform to traditional direct employment
relationships.” Id. at 813.
72. LaFontaine, supra note 60, at 18.
73. Id.
74. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 47, § 9:27.
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connection standard in general.75 Second, Draeger helps illustrate a set of
criteria that is associated with another closely related standard for assessing
the admissibility of insurance evidence under Rules 403 and 411 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Ventura and any jurisdiction with similar
language within its evidentiary rules. This standard is known as the
economic ties standard.
C. ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE EVIDENCE UNDER FED. R. EVID. 411
TO PROVE WITNESS BIAS OR PREJUDICE: THE ECONOMIC TIES
STANDARD AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE SUBSTANTIAL
CONNECTION STANDARD
In Ray v. Draeger, the Supreme Court of Alaska crucially rejected a
minority common law approach to admitting evidence to show witness
bias,76 which merely requires showing that a witness “was receiving money
on behalf of the defense” and does not allow cross-examination to reveal
the fact that the source of a witness’s payment(s) was a respective insurance
company.77 The Draeger court stressed that jurors may not understand the
vague reference of generally receiving money from the defense, plus the
emphasis that “an expert witness with a substantial connection to insurance
companies is working for the side with an interest in minimizing
claims . . .” is best shown to the respective jury by describing the witness’
relationship with insurers in as clear terms as possible.78
Not only does this minority approach contradict the majority approach
under Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,79 the Alaska Rules of
Evidence, and any jurisdiction with similar evidentiary rules for admitting
insurance evidence, but limiting evidence to the vague proof of payment
from the defense contradicts and devalues an evidentiary standard that is
substantially related to the substantial connection majority standard: the
economic ties standard.
Under the economic ties standard, a party can ask a witness, who is
testifying on behalf of the opposing insured party, about the following
information in order to admit liability insurance evidence to prove that
respective witness’s bias or prejudice:

75. Draeger, 353 P.3d at 815 (“[T]he weight of factors that the trial court must balance will
generally be static because the potential for unfair prejudice will probably not vary and thus
should tilt in favor of admission, absent unusual factual circumstances.”).
76. Id. at 813.
77. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 48 (footnote omitted).
78. Draeger, 353 P.3d at 814.
79. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 48; see also Draeger, 353 P.3d at 811 n.13.
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[A]ny economic ties between the witness and the insurance
company that might be expected to color his testimony. . . . any
sort of economic tie that is likely to influence the witness to favor
the insurance company in his testimony may be shown, such as
ownership of stock in the company, or a promise of employment,
or a promise to pay the witness directly for his testimony.80
Furthermore, the opposing party can examine the witness regarding his
prior employment with the respective insurance company, meaning that the
economic tie(s) or relationship does not have to be one that is directly
involved in the case at hand.81
The economic ties standard’s similarities to the majority substantial
connection standard was exemplified by the Draeger court, where the
substantial connection emphasis was mainly based on an expert witness’
“significant ties to the insurance industry”82 or the “financial entanglements
of [both the witness] and the consultancy through which he was hired,”83 all
of which are primarily focused on financial relations or connections
between an expert witness and the insurance industry.84 However, it is
important to note that the economic ties standard is not identical to the
substantial connection standard, because the former only focuses on
financially related factors, whereas the latter is not confined to monetary
factors.85
80. Id. (footnotes omitted) (“The justification for this inquiry is reflected in the ancient
Slavic proverb: ‘Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.’”).
81. Id. (footnotes omitted).
82. Draeger, 353 P.3d at 813 (“[S]ignificant ties to the insurance industry as indicated by
receiving a sizable portion of his or her income from insurance work, being hired by a firm that
derives a large portion of its income from insurance companies, or facts that otherwise suggest an
interest in the outcome of the litigation.”).
83. Id. at 815 (finding a substantial connection between an expert witness and the insurance
industry where the “financial entanglements” of both the expert witness “and the consultancy
through which he was hired” consisted of the expert witness being (a) highly compensated by the
insurance industry to the point where his compensation for his insurance reviews represented a
large percentage of his total yearly income; and (b) where the expert witness was hired for the
Draeger case “by a company that does 98% of its work for insurance companies or defense
attorneys.”).
84. E.g., Garcia v. McKonnen, 156 P.3d 1171, 1173 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
85. Compare Wells v. Tucker, 997 So. 2d 908, 914-16 (Miss. 2008) (holding that no abuse
of discretion occurred by the trial court in refusing to allow cross-examination of three defense
experts to show possible bias as to the fact that all three experts’ medical malpractice insurance
coverage was through the same insurance company as the defendant Tucker and that the experts in
turn might incur a $136 penalty if the plaintiffs’ claim was successful, as the probative value of
$136 “was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the
admission of evidence concerning the existence of a liability insurance policy.”), with Yoho v.
Thompson, 548 S.E.2d 584, 586 (S.C. 2001) (considering factors like maintaining an employment
relationship with both the insurance company in question and other insurance companies,
performing consultations for the insurance company in question in other cases, giving lectures to
the agents and adjusters of the insurance company in question, reviewing records for the insurance
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III. ANALYSIS
In determining whether the district court clearly abused its discretion in
denying Kyle a new trial on the defamation claim,86 the Eight Circuit
provided very in-depth reasoning. However, the appellate court’s holding
was based primarily on two main areas of the law. The legal area most
relevant to North Dakota legal practitioners involved the analysis of Rules
403 and 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A. THE COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC TIES STANDARD
AND THE SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION STANDARD
Overall, the Eighth Circuit remanded the defamation claim for a new
trial because the district court clearly abused its discretion in denying Kyle
a new trial.87 This was due, in part, to both Ventura’s counsel’s prejudicial
questioning of the HarperCollins witnesses and their prejudicial closing
argument statements referring to the HarperCollins witnesses’ knowledge
of insurance coverage related to both Kyle and HarperCollins.88 However,
the Eighth Circuit subtly combined the conceptual forces of the substantial
connection analysis and the economic ties standard.89
First, the Eighth Circuit quite simply applied the majority substantial
connection analysis and determined that HarperCollins witnesses were not
connected enough to the insurance carrier to allow Ventura’s counsel to
cross examine the HarperCollins witnesses90 or make closing argument
remarks91 to argue that under Rule 411, the HarperCollins witnesses “were
biased in favor of Kyle because HarperCollins and Kyle were covered by
the same insurance policy.”92 The court determined that a substantial
connection showing bias or influence by an insurance policy was lacking
because the HarperCollins witnesses were simply unaware of any such

company in question and other insurance companies so much that ten to twenty percent of the
expert witness’s practice consisted of doing so, and the expert witness’s yearly salary was partly
based on his insurance consulting work).
86. Ventura, 825 F.3d at 882.
87. Id. at 888.
88. Id. at 885.
89. Id. at 883.
90. Id. at 882 (“At trial, Ventura’s counsel asked the witness Rosenblum, “whether she was
aware Kyle’s attorneys were ‘being paid by the insurance company for HarperCollins’ and
‘HarperCollins has a direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation because they are
providing the insurance.’”).
91. Specifically, Ventura’s counsel argued that “‘[i]t’s hard to believe that [Rosenblum and
Hubbard] didn’t know about the insurance policy because it’s right in Kyle’s publishing
contract.’” Id. at 883.
92. Ventura, 825 F.3d at 882.
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insurance policy here.93 However, behind this simple determination of a
lack of substantial connection, contains a possibly significant expansion to
the substantial connection analysis.
Specifically, the Eighth Circuit’s substantial connection analysis could
include the economic ties standard as well. This possibility lies within one
seemingly simple sentence within the court’s opinion:
Even if [the HarperCollins witnesses] had been aware of a policy,
any ‘connection’ they had to the insurance carrier was far too
remote to create a risk of bias strong enough to outweigh the
substantial prejudice of Ventura’s counsel’s pointed and repeated
references to unproven insurance.94
Two strong possibilities exist from this statement involving assessing
the admissibility of insurance evidence under Rules 403 and 411 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
First, the court, based on its substantial connection analysis background
information,95 could have implicitly reaffirmed common law precedent
stating that substantial connection analysis jurisdictions reject “a mere
‘commonality of insurance’ approach, holding that the likelihood of bias is
so attenuated that the risk of prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
value.”96 However, this is unlikely because the court supplemented its
substantial connection analysis with an analysis based on the economic ties
standard.97 Specifically, the court concluded that no evidence showed that
HarperCollins’ witnesses had any economic tie to HarperCollins’ insurance
carrier because: “[t]hey were not currently or formerly employed by the
insurance company, seeking employment with the insurance company, paid

93. Id. at 883. For one, regarding Ventura’s counsel’s closing argument statement, the court
noted that “[t]he one-line mention of insurance contained in the lengthy small-print contract
merely acknowledges HarperCollins ‘may carry’ insurance. The publishing contract does not
establish HarperCollins actually purchased insurance, much less that Rosenblum and Hubbard
knew about it.” Id. at 883-84. Also, citing FED. R. EVID. 602, the court stressed that, “[a]s a
matter of basic evidentiary foundation, Ventura never established by direct evidence or reasonable
inference that Rosenblum and Hubbard even knew about any insurance coverage or possible
insurance payment. Rosenblum and Hubbard had no personal knowledge on the topic and were
not qualified to testify on the subject.” Id. at 883.
94. Id. at 884 (footnote omitted) (citing FED. R. EVID. 403 (2016)).
95. See id. at 883 (citing common law precedent stating that substantial connection analysis
jurisdictions reject “a mere ‘commonality of insurance’ approach”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 56-58 (stating that “a per se rule allowing the admission of commonality of
insurance evidence” is the minority rule and that when either a defense witness’s affiliation with
the defendant’s insurance company is “purely coincidental” or when both the defendant and his
expert are both merely policyholders in the same insurance company, the risk of unfair prejudice
in relation to insurance evidence’s probative value is generally viewed as too high).
96. Ventura, 825 F.3d at 883 (quoting Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422, 425 (Colo. 2000)).
97. Id.
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for their testimony by the insurance company, or holders of stock in the
insurance company.”98
More importantly, the court stated that “[t]here was no risk Rosenblum
and Hubbard might personally contribute to the payment of any judgment in
favor of Ventura. Ventura even failed to show a judgment in his favor could
adversely affect Rosenblum’s and Hubbard’s employment with
HarperCollins.”99
While this analysis was included in the court’s
application of the economic ties standard, its emphasis on Rosenblum and
Hubbard being personally affected by the outcome of this case aligns very
closely to the substantial connection analysis emphasized by the Colorado
Court of Appeals in Garcia v. Mekonnen. In Mekonnen, a substantial
connection “had to rise to the level of ownership, agency, or employment to
qualify.”100 The Ventura court’s analysis also closely resembled that of the
Supreme Court of Alaska in Ray v. Draeger, where a substantial connection
must be “a relationship in which a witness has a ‘direct interest in the
outcome of the litigation,’” even if the expert witness and a respective
insurer do not have a formal employment relationship.101 In other words,
the Eighth Circuit in Ventura seemed to have recognized the economic ties
standard’s similarities to the majority substantial connection standard102 to
the point of using the former standard as a supplement to help establish
strict criteria for determining whether a substantial connection was present.
This opportunity for supplementation was provided to the court by the
ambiguous nature that has plagued the substantial connection standard for
years.103
IV. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA PRACTITIONERS
North Dakota has yet to join the majority of jurisdictions already
applying the substantial connection analysis. It is uncertain whether this
reluctance is due to North Dakota’s contentment of its current status quo of
assessing the admissibility of insurance evidence to prove witness bias, or if
the reluctance is based on the lack of uniform criteria within the substantial
connection jurisdictions. Whatever the reason may be, only time will tell if
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Garcia, 156 P.3d at 1175; see supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
101. Draeger, 353 P.3d at 812; see supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 76-84 (using Ray v. Draeger to exemplify the
economic ties standard’s similarities to the majority substantial connection standard).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 60-85 (showing how common law from multiple
jurisdictions have attempted to clear up the ambiguity found within the substantial connection
standard, which includes a common law approach exemplifying the similarities between the
economic ties standard and the majority substantial connection standard).
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the recent high-profile case of Ventura in North Dakota’s own federal
circuit will have any effect on North Dakota’s evidentiary common law
moving forward.
A. NORTH DAKOTA COMMON LAW: STANDARDS FOR GRANTING A
NEW TRIAL AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE
EVIDENCE
Not only has common law firmly established the right for parties to test
opposing witnesses for potential “bias or interest,” but modern codifications
have almost universally included this right as well.104 Furthermore, the
provision from Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that allows for
admitting liability insurance evidence to prove “bias or prejudice of a
witness” is contained in virtually all state codifications, or is nonetheless
implicitly permitted in the few states that do not specifically refer to that
specific permissible use.105
In fact, Rules 403 and 411 of North Dakota’s Rules of Evidence have
virtually identical language to their federal counterparts,106 meaning that
North Dakota appellate courts could apply the same substantial connection
standard used in a majority of jurisdictions.107 However, despite those
similarities, North Dakota common law appears not to be a part of the
majority of jurisdictions applying the substantial connection standard when
assessing the admissibility of liability insurance evidence.
Under North Dakota common law, similar to federal law, the trial court
has discretion in determining whether a new trial should be granted.108 If a
“clear abuse of discretion” does not exist, a trial court’s decision will not be
reversed on appeal.109 Furthermore, North Dakota requires a stronger
showing of an abuse of discretion in granting a motion for a new trial than
denying such a motion because while denying a motion for a new trial ends
a case, granting such a motion merely continues the same case with a

104. David P. Leonard, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED RULES
§ 6.12.1 (2016).
105. Id.
106. See N.D. R. EVID. 403, 411 (2016).
107. For clarification see N.D. R. CIV. P. 59(b) (2016), which lists the grounds for a new
trial; see also Smith v. Anderson, 451 N.W.2d 108, 112 (N.D. 1990) (finding that in North
Dakota, an abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court acts “arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably.”).
108. Neibauer v. Well, 319 N.W.2d 143, 144-45 (N.D. 1982).
109. Id.
OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY
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different jury.110 Thus, compared to an order denying a new trial, an order
granting a new trial is subject to more limited appellate review.111
However, unlike the majority of jurisdictions that employ the
substantial connection standard, North Dakota solely relies on both
exceptions under Rule 411 that allow for admitting insurance evidence, and
the “balancing test”112 under Rule 403.113
As early as 1959, North Dakota held that a new trial was required due
to prejudicial error resulting from the disclosure of the fact that a defendant
did or did not have liability insurance.114 In 1982, Neibauer v. Well, made
an important distinction from prior North Dakota precedent by emphasizing
that as long as a reference to insurance has the effect of informing the jury
that the defendant has liability insurance, that statement can be prejudicial
enough to warrant a new trial, even if that reference to insurance is
“unexpected and inadvertent rather than solicited and deliberate.”115
However, a minor, yet important, factor in Neibauer was that despite the
North Dakota Supreme Court’s explanation of Rule 411, the plaintiff’s
assertion that her reference to insurance was not prejudicial was not based
on the admissibility exceptions under Rule 411.116
This distinction was heavily emphasized in Filloon v. Stenseth, as the
North Dakota Supreme Court noted that unlike the plaintiff in Neibauer, the
appellants in Filloon specifically argued that the insurance evidence
presented by them was for the admissible purpose of showing bias or
prejudice under Rule 411.117 Furthermore, while the Court appropriately
stressed that merely citing a Rule 411 exception does not automatically
grant the admissibility of insurance evidence, the standard used for
determining the admissibility of insurance evidence was the significantly
discretionary “balancing test” under Rule 403 of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence.118 Overall, the closest North Dakota common law has driven
itself away from strict adherence to Rules 403 and 411 is cumulatively

110. Ceartin v. Ochs, 516 N.W.2d 651, 652 (N.D. 1994).
111. Id.
112. Lacher v. Anderson, 526 N.W.2d 108, 109 (N.D. 1994).
113. N.D. R. EVID. 403 (2016) (explaining that this rule simply allows trial judges to
determine if relevant evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice; confusing the issues; misleading the jury; undue delay;
wasting time; or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).
114. Neibauer, 319 N.W.2d at 145.
115. Id. at 146.
116. Id. at 145.
117. Filloon v. Stenseth, 498 N.W.2d 353, 354-55 (N.D. 1993).
118. Id. at 355. In other words, the Filloon court decided that instead of automatically
excluding insurance evidence, trial courts must apply the Rule 403 balancing test to weigh the
potential admissibility of insurance evidence offered under a Rule 411 exception. Id.
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weighing evidentiary errors to determine if defendants’ rights were
deprived in such a prejudicial manner as to warrant the granting of a new
trial.119
B. ADOPTING THE COURT’S FEDERAL STANDARD OF DETERMINING
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE EVIDENCE FOR NORTH
DAKOTA CASE LAW
Being within the Eighth Circuit, North Dakota can offer its legal
practitioners evidentiary legal insight regarding both state and federal
evidentiary matters. More importantly, however, Ventura indirectly poses
an important challenge to North Dakota judges and justices. Specifically,
Ventura now forces North Dakota’s judicial officers to decide whether to
continue on its current common law path in interpreting Rules 403 and 411
of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, or instead, to embrace the majority
substantial connection standard that is applied in its own federal circuit.
This decision, as one could easily predict, is logically simple, yet practically
and subtly more challenging than anticipated.
Arguably the most obvious reason for North Dakota courts to embrace
the substantial connection standard is that the Eight Circuit already applies
it when conducting an analysis under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and
411. Because North Dakota’s evidentiary rules regarding the admissibility
of insurance evidence to show a witness’ bias are virtually the same as its
Eighth Circuit federal counterparts, the fact that Rules 403 and 411 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence contain virtually the same language as Rules 403
and 411 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, would make logical sense
for North Dakota courts to transition into the application of the majority
substantial connection analysis. Even if North Dakota practitioners were to
argue that, as exemplified in Filloon v. Stenseth, maintaining North
Dakota’s standard of adhering to the balancing test under Rule 403 for
determining the admissibility of insurance evidence would provide North
Dakota courts a great amount of discretion, this argument carries very little
weight when considering that the substantial connection analysis also
provides the majority of jurisdictions with a great amount of discretion as
well.
The only difference here is that the substantial connection

119. Ceartin v. Ochs, 516 N.W.2d 651, 655-56 (N.D. 1994) (concluding that trial court did
not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial where (1) parties’ attorneys allowed a report
disclosing defendants’ liability insurance to reach jury; (2) counsel’s closing argument remarks
referencing the existence of liability insurance; and (3) the jury’s award of future economic
damages neither claimed nor supported by evidence; and also stating “[p]erhaps no single
irregularity would have caused much concern. Cumulatively, however, they led the trial court to
believe that the defendants may have been deprived of a fair trial.”).
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jurisdictions share a uniform standard of assessing the admissibility of
insurance evidence, while North Dakota seems to remain content on a more
case-by-case approach that merely interprets Rules 403 and 411. However,
the uniformity enjoyed by substantial connection jurisdictions might be a
deceptive mirage.
As exemplified by cases like Yoho v. Thompson, Garcia v. Mekonnen,
and Ray v. Draeger, the seemingly big happy family of jurisdictions that
make the substantial connection analysis the majority standard still seems to
lack a uniform set of criteria for establishing a substantial connection in
each case between witnesses and respective insurance companies. Thus,
this lack of uniformity within the substantial connection jurisdictions help
justify the reluctance that some North Dakota practitioners might have in
abandoning the State’s current standard. However, in tandem with its highprofile status, the Eighth Circuit’s extension/supplementation to the
substantial connection standard in Ventura might help persuade other
substantial connection jurisdictions to follow in its footsteps and create a
more uniform substantial connection analysis. Specifically, Ventura might
influence other substantial connection jurisdictions to also expand their
criteria by supplementing the economic ties standard alongside the
substantial connection analysis.
While the substantial connection analysis is not confined to financially
related factors, unlike the economic ties standard, having the latter’s strict
set of criteria as a supplemental reference can promote greater uniformity
among these jurisdictions, thus promoting a more uniform rule of law in
general. This was appropriately shown in the court’s opinion in Ventura.
While the Eighth Circuit’s determination of a lack of a substantial
connection was simply based on the witnesses’ lack of awareness of any
relevant insurance policy, the Ventura court also likely adopted the
economic ties standard as an alternative legal safety net that was used, in
that case, to show a lack of substantial connection even if the witnesses
were aware of an insurance policy.
In sum, the law is not static. Instead, the law is an evolutionary
mechanism that changes with its surrounding environment. On a national
scale, the evolving manner in which jurisdictions have assessed the
admissibility of insurance evidence to prove witness bias has been
chronicled for over a decade now, as the substantial connection standard
grew from a minority standard as early as 2001 to the majority standard
today. In fact, Ventura is proof that the substantial connection analysis is
still changing and expanding. The expansion and evolution of the
substantial connection analysis might explain North Dakota’s reluctance to
adopt that standard and abandon its current analytical approach. Perhaps
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Ventura will alleviate some of that reluctance now that North Dakota’s own
federal circuit has expanded upon the majority substantial connection
standard in such a high-profile case. Only time will tell whether North
Dakota becomes the next link in the majority standard’s chain.
C. THE SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION STANDARD WILL PREVENT NORTH
DAKOTA FROM AIMLESSLY WANDERING ON A CASE-BY-CASE
BASIS OF ANALYSIS
Even if the substantial connection analysis jurisdictions do not enjoy an
elegantly uniform set of criteria, it is important to remember this standard’s
close alignment with the underlying rationale for the admissibility of
insurance evidence. In Vasquez v. Rocco, before adopting the substantial
connection standard,120 the Connecticut Supreme Court stressed that even if
a jurisdiction’s rules of evidence allow admission of insurance evidence to
prove witness bias or prejudice,
A concern remains, however, that jurors might be influenced by
such evidence because they may believe that an insurance
company is better able than the parties to bear any loss resulting
from the defendant’s alleged negligence. Although today’s jurors
probably assume that all physicians carry malpractice insurance,
“the introduction of evidence on the subject tends to emphasize
something that is usually irrelevant and that may have an adverse
effect on the quality of the jury’s deliberations and conclusions.”
Nevertheless, the risk of undue prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the introduction of such evidence must be weighed against
the plaintiff’s right of cross-examination regarding motive,
interest, bias or prejudice, a right that may not be unduly
restricted.121
In other words, the Vasquez court crucially emphasized the need to
weigh virtually every trial participant’s interests when determining the
admissibility of insurance evidence, including the defendants, the plaintiffs,
and each jury member. This emphasis on balancing multiple interests
throughout the trial process is arguably the reason for why a majority of
jurisdictions have adopted the substantial connection analysis, which

120. Vasquez v. Rocco, 836 A.2d 1158, 1165 (Conn. 2003).
121. Id. at 1163 (footnote and citations omitted); see also supra note 58 and accompanying
text (emphasizing “the risk of unfair prejudice in relation to insurance evidence’s probative value
is generally viewed as too high when either a defense witness’s affiliation with the defendant’s
insurance company is ‘purely coincidental’ or when both the defendant and his expert are both
merely policyholders in the same insurance company”).
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provides an objectively beneficial supplement for jurisdictions’ evidentiary
rules similar to Rules 403 and 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
To put it frankly, the substantial connection analysis gives teeth to any
judicial analysis regarding the admissibility of insurance evidence to prove
witness bias. At the same time, the substantial connection analysis still
affords trial judges a great deal of discretionary power, only now they will
have an analytical compass instead of wandering aimlessly on a case-bycase basis. While the Ventura court appropriately utilized this analytical
compass, North Dakota continues to wander aimlessly with its mere
reliance on the balancing test under Rule 403 of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence.
With or without the supplemental assistance of the economic ties
standard, the substantial connection analysis still places a burden on an
offering party’s insurance evidence to pass a certain threshold to gain
admissibility, otherwise other means besides insurance evidence should
probably be used to establish bias.122 This threshold is clearly emphasized
in Vasquez:
Underlying this analysis is the premise that only some
relationships between a defendant’s expert witness and the
defendant’s insurance carrier give rise to an inference of bias that
outweighs the countervailing risk that jurors might use the
evidence for an improper purpose. Thus, when a witness has a
substantial connection to the defendant’s insurer, such as that of
agency, employment or control, evidence of that relationship is
considered sufficiently probative of bias that it is admissible
despite the risk of prejudice to the defendant. On the other hand,
when the witness is merely a policyholder of the defendant’s
insurer, the witness is unlikely to be influenced by that relationship
and, consequently, the risk of prejudice to the defendant from the
admission of such evidence is deemed to outweigh its probative
value. Thus, in the absence of any other connection between the
witness and the defendant’s insurer, evidence that the witness and
the defendant are insured by the same carrier is insufficient to
justify the admission of that evidence under the “substantial
connection” test.123

122. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (stressing “it has even been encouraged to
use other means besides introducing insurance evidence if those means can establish an equivalent
bias”).
123. Vasquez, 836 A.2d at 1164-65 (citations omitted).
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Thus, within the term “substantial,” the substantial connection analysis
can assess relevant insurance evidence’s connection to a witness in terms of
its degree, quantity, or both, so long as that connection shows the insurer is
likely influencing a respective witness to bias his testimony. For example,
in Yoho v. Thompson, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
substantial connection standard was met due to a quantitatively sufficient
amount of cumulative evidence.124 Meanwhile, the Colorado Court of
Appeals in Garcia v. Mekonnen took a different approach, focusing less on
the amount of evidence, and instead focused more on the degree of
influence that insurance evidence could have on a respective witness.125
While each approach is subtly different, both can still be used to provide
trial judges with a more reliable framework of determining the admissibility
of insurance evidence to prove witness bias under the substantial
connection analysis.
North Dakota, on the other hand, has no such framework to assess how
much influence an insurance carrier might have on a respective witness at
trial. Instead, the court in Filloon v. Stenseth merely ensured that insurance
evidence cannot be automatically excluded at trial.126 This common law
standard basically informs trials judges that the likelihood of a witness
being influenced and biased from his connection with a respective insurance
carrier completely depends on judicial discretion.
In other words, North Dakota common law places offering parties at
the mercy of a trial judge without the safety net of judicial restraints like the
substantial connection analysis or even the economic ties standard. This is
not to say that North Dakota trial judges are untrustworthy or incompetent.
Instead, the lack of any set standard also jeopardizes judicial decision
making. Without a standard like the substantial connection analysis, North

124. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (exemplifying the satisfaction of the
substantial connection standard through cumulative evidence where “[I]nstead of merely being
paid an expert’s fee in the case at hand, the expert witness: a) ‘maintained an employment
relationship’ with both the insurance company in question and other insurance companies; b)
performed consultations in other cases for the insurance company in question; c) gave lectures to
the agents and adjusters of the insurance company in question; d) reviewed records for the
insurance company in question and other insurance companies so much that ten to twenty percent
of his practice consisted of doing so; and e) the expert witness’s yearly salary was partly based on
his insurance consulting work.”).
125. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the substantial
connection standard demanded more than mere payment in exchange for trial testimony, and
instead required a connection between a witness and insurer “to rise to the level of ownership,
agency, or employment to qualify”).
126. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (stressing that while merely citing a Rule
411 exception does not automatically grant the admissibility of insurance evidence, the standard
used for determining the admissibility of insurance evidence was merely the greatly discretionary
“balancing test” under N.D. R. EVID. 403).
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Dakota trial judges are forced to aimlessly rule on the admissibility of
insurance evidence to prove bias, even if they are unfamiliar with this area
of the law. Without any guideposts to assist trial judges here, biased
witnesses could be erroneously deemed unbiased and vice versa. Until this
judicial discretion is checked, North Dakota insurance evidentiary
jurisprudence will likely remain in an uncertain case-by-case atmosphere.
V. CONCLUSION
Overall, with regard to the defamation claim, the Eighth Circuit in
Ventura v. Kyle vacated both the defamation judgment and damages award
and remanded the defamation claim for a new trial.127 Within its holding to
grant a new trial, the Eighth Circuit adopted a majority standard in the
substantial connection analysis to bolster the codified method of
determining the admissibility of insurance evidence under Rules 403 and
411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In essence, applying the substantial
connection standard to the determination of insurance evidence’s
admissibility still provides the trial court with a plethora of leeway and
discretion when deciding cases, but the substantial connection standard
helps to keep the trial court’s discretion in check on a more uniform basis.
However, while the substantial connection standard is widely accepted,
the way in which to determine whether a substantial connection exists
between an expert witness and the insurance industry is not uniformly
applied in each jurisdiction adopting that standard, leaving room for
interpretation among each jurisdiction applying the substantial connection
analysis. Therefore, as a supplement to the substantial connection analysis,
the Eighth Circuit applied the similar, yet different, economic ties standard
to help determine that Kyle was entitled to a new trial based on the district
court’s abuse of discretion for allowing Ventura’s counsel to ask overly
prejudicial questions related to insurance to the two witnesses from the
publisher of Kyle’s book, HarperCollins, as well as reference to Kyle’s
insurance in their closing argument.
Although North Dakota resides in the Eighth Circuit, its common law
does not adopt the substantial connection analysis and merely interprets
Rules 403 and 411 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, leaving arguably
too much discretion in state trial courts’ hands. Since Rules 403 and 411 of
North Dakota’s Rules of Evidence are virtually identical to their federal
counterparts, North Dakota common law could easily adopt the majority

127. Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 888 (8th Cir. 2016). In addition, the court reversed the
unjust enrichment judgment and vacated the accompanying damages award as well. Id.
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substantial connection standard. However, North Dakota common law may
merely uphold the status quo due to the substantial connection standard’s
lack of uniform criteria.
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